E-TRADING QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS by Syrgak-Kyzy, Aikanysh & McNab, Ruth Joanna
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) Major Qualifying Projects
January 2012
E-TRADING QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Aikanysh Syrgak-Kyzy
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Ruth Joanna McNab
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Major Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Syrgak-Kyzy, A., & McNab, R. J. (2012). E-TRADING QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all/308
  
 
  
 
 
 
E – Trading Quantitative Analysis 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch London 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
 
By: 
Ruth McNab, 
Aikanysh Syrgak-Kyzy 
Friday, December 16
th
, 2011 
 
E-TRADING QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
A Major Qualifying Project 
Submitted to the faculty of 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Bachelor of Science 
 
Sponsoring Agency: Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
 
 
 
Submitted by: 
 
 
__________________________ 
Ruth McNab 
 
__________________________ 
Aikanysh Srygak-Kyzy 
 
 
December 16, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report Submitted to: 
 
Whit Smith 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch  
 
Prof. Justin Wang and Prof. Art Gerstenfeld 
School of Business 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
 i | P a g e  
 
ABSTRACT 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) currently keeps all data on trades, i.e. all credit 
and cash products and electronic inquiries in a number of databases globally, which can be a 
very useful decision making tool if used correctly. The Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA) 
Global Credit Trading Desk presently generates numerous reports in varying stages of 
completion currently distributed to both traders and managers, and is run on an ad hoc basis. 
However, neither managers nor traders are effectively utilizing them. Thus, the goal of our 
project was to analyze e-trading data collected to assist in future trading decisions and 
management reporting for the benefit of the traders on the BAML trading desk. Then we used 
such analysis to produce reports that can stand alone as a standard and be leveraged for all future 
analysis. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch stores all data on trades and potential trades from the 
credit and equity markets (thousands of data points each day, the result of conducting normal 
business as a market maker) in numerous databases worldwide.  This data can be very useful to a 
trader when making decisions on pricing and risk taking if used correctly, which is not 
necessarily the case today.  There are many reports in varying stages of completion currently 
distributed to both traders and managers, and run on an ad hoc basis by, The Desk. This is the 
trading desk where traders receive inquiries which can either be the buying or selling of a cash or 
credit product. 
Thus the goal of this project was to analyse aggregated quantitative data procured over 
the course of trading electronically (“Inquiry”) to assist in future trading decisions and 
management reporting for the benefit of the traders on BAML trading desk (“The Desk”). The 
aim of this was to use this data to produce reference analytics/reports that can stand alone as a 
standard and be leveraged for all future analysis. 
In order to accomplish our goal, we analysed raw inquiry data so as to ascertain how 
these reports were being used and how could they be used. Furthermore, we developed a new 
performance metric called the Hit Rate Index and wrote SQL code that could be augmented so 
that this metric could be embedded into present reports.  Finally after interviewing some junior 
traders and reviewing the content of the reports we looked at ways to improve their attractiveness 
and usefulness.  
Based on our evaluation we provided the Global Credit Products EMEA Credit Desk 
with suggestions and recommendations on how to further improve their reports and make them 
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more useful for summary, trend and performance reporting to managers and traders. With these 
improvements, it stands to reason that these reports can give added insight to the trading desk. 
They could be used as performance measures as well as in anticipation of business, which could 
lead to more profitable decision making.  For example, managers can readily see more accurate 
Hit Rates for priority clients and make adjustments where possible. For traders, they create these 
markets and are charged with making the business money. Therefore if they can use these reports 
to anticipate what their individual markets are doing then they can attack trades with more 
knowledge.  
At the completion of our project at Bank of America Merrill Lynch we made three 
recommendations. The first recommendation was to change the organization of the reports, 
specifically organize by business sector or pod. Since the current reports contain a breakdown by 
trader, it would be beneficial for report recipients to see a breakdown by pod as well, since some 
of them are in the same pod and trade the same products.  
Our next recommendation was to introduce a graphical tool that can produce visuals. 
Some of the reports generated by the reporting application ConnectX, come as an Excel 
attachment that the bank employees need to open and do further analysis on their own to gain 
any added value. Consequently, introducing graphs and charts that summarize the information in 
the attached file would provide an insight to data and be less time-consuming for report users 
such as traders. The limitation is that ConnectX uses SQL as a programming language and does 
not have an ability to build graphs and charts. There are a few solutions to this: to program 
ConnectX in Python or Quartz, or collect the data from the SQL database, import it into 
Microsoft Excel and then use Excel macros to create the graphs manually, however that later 
option would take more time.     
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Finally, our last recommendation was looking into the future. If the business is moving 
towards a centralized database and reporting system, either augment ConnectX to carry out our 
previous recommendations and roll this new and improved application to the various desks 
globally, or leverage what works about ConnectX and implement it into a new system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) stores all data on trades and potential trades 
from the credit and equity markets (thousands of data points each day, the result of conducting 
normal business as a market maker) in a number of databases globally.  This data can be very 
useful to a trader when making decisions on pricing and risk taking when used correctly, which 
is not necessarily the case today.  There are numerous reports in varying stages of completion 
currently distributed to both traders and managers, and run on an ad hoc basis by, The Desk. We 
will repeatedly refer to this Desk throughout the paper and it should be noted that this is the 
trading desk where traders receive inquires and orders which can either be the buying or selling 
of a cash or credit product. 
The objective of this project was to analyse aggregated quantitative data procured over 
the course of trading electronically (“Inquiry”) to assist in future trading decisions and 
management reporting for the benefit of the traders on our trading desk (“The Desk”).   Thus, we 
will use this data to produce a number of reference analytics/reports that can stand alone as a 
standard and be leveraged for all future analysis. 
To support this goal we would like to embed this Inquiry data into the normal decision 
tree when considering a trade where appropriate.  The Inquiry gives the trader a picture of what a 
particular client is interested in trading, what a particular subset of clients is interested in trading 
and in some cases what the entire market wants to trade.  While we do not understand these 
relationships today, we hope to start building connections by augmenting the Inquiry data with 
descriptive statistics with the aim of inferring causation where possible. 
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Since BAML already has a database in place, the focus of this project was to extract and 
analyse the data currently available in order to determine any deficiencies in the data and 
drawing conclusions from the data to be vetted by The Desk.   
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2. BACKGROUND 
Electronic trading also known as e-trading, is a method of trading securities such as 
stocks and bonds amongst other financial derivatives and foreign exchange, electronically. 
Buyers and sellers are brought together using various trading platforms to create a virtual market 
place. This method of trading is making strides and is expanding over voice and floor trading 
which are historically the most common types of trading these markets are accustomed to. 
However, in today’s world, more and more of the market gravitates to doing things 
electronically. Therefore financial institutions such as Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) 
and their various competitors are seeking to improve their methods of trading as well as 
analyzing how successful their business currently is and where can they build on in this new 
avenue.  This chapter will give a brief history of BAML, the various tools they have to facilitate 
e-trading, the current systems in place for data analysis across the business and the gaps in the 
existing methods of analysis and reporting for the EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) 
division of BAML.  
2.1.  HISTORY OF BANK OF AMERICA  
 Bank of America Corporation is a banking and financial services corporation formed 
through NationsBank’s acquisition of BankAmerica in 1998 (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011). 
This corporation is one of the largest banking organizations in the United States, with their 
headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
The bank’s history dates to 1904 when Amadeo Peter Giannini opened the Bank of Italy 
in San Francisco. It eventually developed into Bank of America and was for a time owned by 
Giannini’s holding company, Transamerica Corporation. It issued the first bank credit card, 
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BankAmeriCard, in 1958. (The first universal credit card, which could be used at a variety of 
establishments, had been introduced by the Diners’ Club, Inc., in 1950.) 
In 1968, the newly named BankAmerica Corporation was organized in Delaware as a 
holding company for Bank of America NT & SA and other financial subsidiaries. One of 
BankAmerica’s most significant acquisitions was the 1983 purchase of Washington state bank 
Seafirst Corporation, which was the biggest U.S. interstate bank merger to date. After purchasing 
its major competitor in California, Security Pacific Corporation, in 1991, Bank of America 
became the first bank to offer coast-to-coast operations in the United States. It expanded into 
New England with the acquisition of FleetBoston Financial Corporation in 2004, and by the 
early 21st century, it was operating more than 5,500 bank branches in more than 20 U.S. states 
and conducting corporate and investment banking in numerous countries worldwide. The firm 
enlarged its credit-card business by acquiring National Processing, a transaction-processing firm, 
in 2004, while its merger with MBNA Corporation in 2006 made Bank of America a leading 
issuer of credit cards. 
To gain a strong position in the wealth-management business, Bank of America planned 
in 2007 to acquire U.S. Trust Corporation, an investment firm that manages investments for 
high-net-worth individuals. In September 2008, Bank of America Corporation announced its 
plans to acquire Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., pending the approval of both companies’ regulators 
and shareholders. In January 2009, Bank of America announced that it would receive $20 billion 
in U.S. government aid and an additional $118 billion in guarantees against bad assets incurred 
because of the acquisition of Merrill Lynch. In exchange for the emergency funding, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury would acquire shares in the bank. 
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 Presently Bank of America Corporation is a world leading financial institution and is a 
component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Bank of America, 2011).  They have a wide 
range of products and services ranging from banking, investing, to various other financial and 
risk management services. They also serve individual customers as well as small to middle 
market businesses and large corporations in over 150 countries.  
 
2.2.  CREDIT PRODUCTS: CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS & CORPORATE BONDS 
The United States has traditionally dominated the world’s bond markets. Such bonds 
issued in the US now account for less than half –about 44%--of the global bond market volume 
(Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), 2012). Interestingly in the US, the bond 
market is about the same size as the stock market. However in Europe, bonds account for about 
2/3 of the total amount of securities outstanding in bonds and shares. About 60% of the European 
bond market is government bond debt, 29% is corporate, and 11% is asset-backed; in the US, the 
proportion of bonds issued by the corporate sector is said to be much larger.  
Corporate Bonds are capital market instruments and in general are bonds issued by a 
corporation; carries no claim to ownership and pays no dividends but payments to bondholders 
have priority over payments to stockholders (Corporate Finance Group, 2005).  Some corporate 
bonds called convertible bonds have the additional feature of allowing the holder to convert them 
to a specified number of shares of stock at any time up to the maturity date.  Such products offer 
investors a measure of safety, as corporate bonds are evaluated and assigned a rating based on 
credit history and ability to repay obligations ( The Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, 2010). The higher the rating, the safer the investment as measured by the odds of 
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repayment of principal and interest. However, based on discussions with our sponsor it should be 
noted that BAML does not trade convertible bonds. 
The corporate bond market sector is one of the largest in the United States and ranked 
third after the sovereign government bond sector and mortgage bond, which accounts for 28% 
and 26% of the market respectively. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), as of Q2 2011, the U. S. corporate bond market size was about 7.7 trillion 
dollars which accounts for about 24% of the market (Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, 2012). Looking at the global market, approximately 30% of outstanding bonds are 
corporate bonds. The corporate bond market in Europe continues to grow and develop however, 
recent market instability has caused a slowdown.  
In the European corporate bond market, individual investors are less involved directly in 
the corporate bond market unlike in the US. According to the Association of Financial Markets 
in Europe (AFME), most corporate bonds trade in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, however 
this market does not exist in a central location (AFME, 2011). It is made up of bond dealers and 
brokers from both local and global markets who trade debt securities over the phone or 
electronically. These investors make use of electronic transaction systems to bolster the trade 
execution process. Like government bonds, some bonds are traded on exchanges, but the bond 
trading volume on the exchanges is small. The OTC market is much larger than the exchange 
markets, and the vast majority of bond transactions, even those involving exchange-listed issues, 
take place in this market.  
The key players in the corporate bond market can be categorized into the following 
groups: issuers, underwriters, and purchasers (EconomyWatch, 2010). The issuers consist of 
institutions and entities that sell bonds to raise funds to finance their operations. These could 
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include banks, both local and multinational, as well as the government as an issuing entity. 
Underwriters are comprised mainly of investment banks and other leaders in the field of 
investment and they help issuers to raise funds through the selling of bonds. In effect, they are 
the intermediaries of the industry. The purchasers are simply the ones that purchase the debt 
instruments and could range from corporations to individual investors who invest in the bond 
market through various avenues. 
Credit default swaps or CDS are traded derivatives on which the seller is required to 
make a payment to the holder of the CDS if there is a credit event for that instrument such as a 
bankruptcy or downgrading of the firms credit rating (Mishkin, Frederic S, 2010). Wall Street 
invented them in the late 1990s as a form of insurance (Norris, 2011). The original purpose of 
swaps was to make it easier for banks to issue complex debt securities by reducing the risk to 
purchasers. Between 2000 and 2008, the market for such swaps ballooned from $900 billion to 
more than $30 trillion. In sharp contrast to traditional insurance, swaps are unregulated. They 
played a pivotal role in the global financial meltdown in late 2008.  
More recently, swaps have emerged as one of the most powerful and mysterious forces in 
the crisis shaking Greece and other members of the euro zone (Norris, 2011). Furthermore, they 
have become the subject of antitrust investigations in both the United States and the European 
Union. The investigations focused on whether the handful of big banks that dominate the swaps 
field have harmed rival organizations that could compete in markets for providing information 
and clearing swaps deals. For more information on Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Bonds, 
please refer to Appendix A. 
 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
2.3.  GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY & OPERATIONS 
The Global Technology & Operations (GT&O) division of BAML is an organization of 
more than 74,000 associates worldwide (Bank of American, 2011a). GT&O includes technology 
and operations supporting business lines across the enterprise. Through operations in more than 
40 countries, GT&O provides end-to-end technology and fulfillment to consumer households, 
small businesses, corporate and institutional relationships and wealth and investment 
management clients. In the United States, it serves approximately 58 million consumer and small 
business relationships with approximately 5,700 retail-banking offices and approximately 18,000 
ATMs and award-winning online banking with 29 million active users. 
2.3.1.  GLOBAL CREDIT PRODUCTS AT BANK OF AMERICA 
Credit comes under the Global Markets umbrella division of Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch (BAML).  Global Markets and Research Technology & Operations (GMRT&O) provides 
end-to-end technology solutions and operations support for the Global Markets businesses 
including Equity, Electronic Trading, Rates & Currencies, Credit & Structured Products, 
Commodities, Research, Sales and Capital Markets. In addition, the group is responsible for 
establishing an Architecture and Strategy framework for consistency across the Global Markets 
platforms. 
BAML is a leader in global credit markets, providing innovative financing solutions to 
clients all over the world. (Bank of America Corporation, 2011)Their platform helps client’s 
access liquidity, manage risk and maximize value across the broad credit universe. There are 
credit teams across the world covering the different world financial markets, i.e. the Americas, 
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Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA) and Asia. These teams use BAML’s credit platform to 
provide liquidity and make markets for a broad suite of credit products, including investment 
grade and high yield corporate bonds, short-term trading vehicles, credit defaults swaps and 
other derivative products.  The team facilitates capital raising and finds investors for investment 
grade and non-investment grade rated borrowers of money in primary markets. 
2.3.2.  CURRENT SITUATION OF THE EMEA CREDIT TEAM 
Presently the EMEA credit team, which is based out of the BAML London office, 
produces automated daily and weekly reports of aggregated trade data for specific credit 
products, i.e. corporate bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) using an application called 
ConnectX. ConnectX is a reporting tool that is used to send reports on a timely basis to managers 
and traders at the Credit and Rates Desk in London. The reports that are being distributed contain 
raw data as well as summaries of daily activities of the trading desk. For the reports that contain 
raw data, they show all information received by the desk regarding all transactions and done 
trades for a particular day, week, and year-to-date. This includes the Trade Date, Trade Time, 
CDS Name, Side, Quantity, Trade Status, Executing Trader, CDS Owner etc. (See Appendix C 
for a glossary of terms). However there are other reports that contain more specified information 
such as total orders and inquires by trader for the buying or selling of bonds and CDS, 
performance of each trader, done trades, break down by volume and count of tickets received. A 
ticket is a term used by BAML to represent an inquiry and an order together.  
However, there is a gap in the information that is extrapolated from these timely reports. 
Information such as: What types of financial products are traded on a daily basis? What is the 
frequency and volume of such trades? Who are making these trades? What are the market 
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indicators that lead to such decisions? The answering of these questions is the basic essence of 
this report. To carry this out we need to analyze the data from the electronic trading systems used 
at the Bank of America London corporate office.  Therefore, we hope to use methods of data 
mining to determine the types of products that are being traded and the types of clients as well as 
the time of day that these clients are trading these products.  This thus enables performance, 
trend and summary metric reports to be more useful to traders and managers in making business 
decisions.  
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3. METHODOLOGY  
Our goal was to provide recommendations to the Bank of America Global Credit 
Products EMEA Credit Desk on how to make the daily and weekly reports, which are generated 
by the desk, using ConnectX more useful to traders, managers and other relevant personnel. This 
goal was pursued through an analysis of the current system to identify the gaps, as well as 
through data analysis to see what could be added or subtracted from the scope of the reports. 
In order to accomplish our goal, we have developed, in conjunction with our sponsor, the 
following three objectives: 
 Develop new metrics and embed them into reports  
 Analyse aggregated quantitative inquiry data 
 Improve reports and make them more attractive to recipients  
Based on the above objectives, we developed a methodology that helped identify the 
current inefficiencies and shed light on possible solutions. The following sections will explain 
how we achieved each of our objectives. The  
Figure 1 on the next page shows the detailed plan of our project. 
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23-Oct 30-Oct 6-Nov 13-Nov 20-Nov 27-Nov 4-Dec 11-Dec 18-Dec
Get settled in the bank: accounts, phones, etc.
Create a glossaries of terms
Develop a mathematical concept of Hit Rate Index
Turn Hit Rate Index into SQL
Prepare a presentation of current state of ConnectX reports
Consolidate to a few key reports: ensure all use owner…
Review /Summarize all ConnectX reports - metrics, breakouts…
Create ConnectX reports by onwer and pod
Create intraday snapshots
Ensure SQL joins are consistent
Buy vs. Sell % - define intrday, weekly (M vs. F), monthly…
 
3.1. DEVELOP NEW METRICS AND EMBED THEM INTO REPORTS 
In the first phase of our project, we determined how we could enhance the way these 
reports can be used to determine how the business is performing at any given time. This was 
accomplished by looking at the Hit Rate Concept. The Hit Rate is a metric presently used to 
measure how the Desk is doing on an individual trader basis. The Hit Rate is calculated by 
dividing done trades by total trades. Specifically on orders it is done orders over total orders and 
for inquiries it is done inquiries over (total inquiries minus not done inquiries). This current 
metric is insufficient because it does not account for inquiries we do in competition, thus 
anything that has dealers being greater than 1. We then sought to make this better by developing 
 
Figure 1: The GANNT chart for the duration of the project 
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a Hit Rate Index, which mathematically shows the overall performance of the trading desk for a 
particular day taking into account the number of dealers in competition.  
3.2. ANALYSE AGGREGATED QUANTITATIVE INQUIRY DATA   
 In order to understand how these reports could be used to track and showcase trends we 
decided to look at the raw data collected on a daily basis. Thus we imported data for a particular 
day, week or month from the SQL database into various excel spread sheets and then used this to 
produce visual snapshots which were then analysed. With this in-depth statistical and descriptive 
analysis we were able to determine what would be useful to be showcased to trader’s automated 
reports that they receive. We did analysis and provided snapshots on a daily, weekly, monthly 
and quarterly (three month time period) in order to show how useful such information could be 
to traders and managers who want to predict possible future market indicators based on trends 
seen in the past. 
3.3. IMPROVE REPORTS AND MAKE THEM MORE ATTRACTIVE TO RECIPIENTS 
The last phase of our project consisted of defining an improved method for the layout of 
these reports that is, making them more attractive and useful to the relevant recipients. A major 
component of this task was identifying effective and efficient methods of presenting these 
reports to traders and managers. Therefore, to gain added insight into what the recipients wanted, 
we informally tried to set up interviews with some traders on the credit team. Through such 
discussions it was our aim to gauge why they do not use the reports and what changes they 
would be interested in seeing in the layout and presentation of them. However in the end we 
were only able to speak with two of them. A sample of the questions we asked can be seen in 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions for Junior Traders. Based on the responses of the traders 
we designed a new proposed layout using SQL. 
3.4. SUMMARY 
Determining how to make the reporting system and the reports more useful are key 
factors in our recommendations for an improved system. Our primary means for collecting data 
was through the present ConnectX reports, BAML’s SQL database and the interviews with the 
junior traders. These methods allowed us to analyse the problem and enabled us to see where the 
breakdown is and how the system can be enhanced.  Thus based on our evaluation, we provided 
the Global Credit Products EMEA Credit Desk with suggestions and recommendations on how 
to further improve their reports and make them more useful for summary, trend and performance 
reporting to managers and traders.  
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1.   DEVELOPMENT OF NEW METRICS AND EMBEDDING THEM INTO REPORTS 
 To understand what metrics would be useful to embed into the ConnectX reports we 
analysed the performance measures presently used in the system. As mentioned in the 
Methodology chapter, this was accomplished by looking at the Hit Rate Concept. Some of the 
generated reports show a calculated hit rate.  
Fundamentally, this hit rate was calculated by dividing done trades by total trades. It 
should be noted that a trade status can be classified as either done or not done in the case of an 
order and done,  not done, done away, none and unknown in the case of an inquiry. An order is a 
type of trade or ticket received from a client that goes to one trader and it means that the client is 
willing to buy or sell a bond. On the other hand, an inquiry is a bond in competition. It is an 
electronic interaction between a client and the desk. Thus it is when a client tries to trade with 
the desk. Therefore both orders and inquiries are types of trades that are received by traders 
electronically. For more detail on this please see the glossaries in Appendix C: Glossary of 
Terms for the Credit & Cash Databases Used by the EMEA Credit Desk.  
The hit rate being used presently as defined on orders as done orders over total orders and 
for inquiries it is done inquiries over (total inquiries minus not done inquiries). This current 
metric was insufficient because it did not account for inquiries done in competition, thus 
anything that has dealers being greater than 1.  Therefore we developed a new mathematical 
concept for measuring performance called the Hit Rate Index.   
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Table 1 below shows inquiry data we pulled and then pivoted from the database. In order 
to develop a new mathematical concept, first, we pulled data for one week of October, 2011 from 
the SQL server and pivoted it into 5 tables, in the format used in Table 1. When pivoting tables 
we selected fields that were used in a previous Hit Rate calculation, such as type of trades, either 
order or inquiries, action detail which depicts whether an order or a trade was done or not done, 
nominal USD. Then we added a new field of dealers to show how many dealers were in 
competition for an inquiry. An order always has only one dealer in competition. Finally, the table 
also displays totals for each dealer and each action detail.    
Table 1: The calculation of the Hit Rate Index for 25/10/2011 
 
The process of developing the Hit Rate Index involved a number of mathematical 
calculations. The first step was the simple calculation of the expected Hit Rate and the formula is 
1 over number of dealers. Thus we got the percentages shown in circles in Table 2 on the next 
page. In the example, there are 2 dealers in competition for an inquiry, thus the expected Hit Rate 
is 50%. It is the minimum percentage for the EMEA trading desk of getting the trade done 
similarly the other dealer in competition has a 50% chance to successfully get the trade. The 
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reason why we didn’t set the expected Hit Rate as 100% for every trade, no matter how many 
dealers are in competition, was that it is unfair to expect a trader to get every single trade.   
Table 2: The calculation of the Expected Hit Rates 
 
The next step in the process was to calculate Hit Rates for orders and inquiries. In order 
to do that we used the formulas shown below: 
Hit Rate for orders: 
          
           
 
Hit Rate for Inquiries: 
              
                                   
 
Then we found Hit Rate Indexes by dividing newly calculated Hit Rates by the Expected 
Hit Rates for both orders and inquiries.  
Subsequently we now had to find out what percentage of the grand total nominal USD 
was the total nominal USD for each dealer in competition. We took these totals and divided each 
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by the overall Grand Total. The results of that calculation were divided by the Hit Rate Indexes 
thus giving us the numbers in the red circle in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Percentages of the Grand Total 
 
Finally we summed all the numbers in the red circle above together and got the number 
highlighted in yellow in Table 3. This table represents our new mathematical concept of the Hit 
Rate Index, which can be calculated for each trader for a working day, month and year. The 
simplified formula is shown in Figure below. Due to proprietary BAML rights the Completed 
SQL is not showcased in this report. 
 
Figure 2: The formula for calculating the Hit Rate Index 
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This new Index takes the Expected Hit Rate, which is the inverse of the number of 
dealers in competition, and measures it against the weighted average of the calculated Hit Rate.  
As a result, the Hit Rate Index shows the overall performance of the trading desk for a particular 
day taking into account the number of dealers in competition. It is more beneficial than the old 
concept because now the report recipients can see the performance not only for a particular 
trader but for the whole trading desk.  
4.2.   ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATED QUANTITATIVE DATA 
In order to understand how these reports could be used to analyse trends we imported raw 
data from the SQL database into various excel spread sheets and then used these to produce 
visual snapshots which were then evaluated.  Analysis was done for different time periods, i.e. 
daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly by creating charts for each respective period to review 
which would be most beneficial. The emphasis was placed on looking at the performance of the 
business over time with respect to specific pods or counter parties. BAML’s definition of a pod 
is a specific sector that the desk conducts business with, namely corporate, high yield and 
financial companies. Raw trade data was imported to look at both the buying and selling sides of 
these pods as traders in the business are creating markets for the products being bought and sold 
by the desk. Thus by using the information compiled, traders could more readily pick up on 
trends and analyse the market to see if the atmosphere of the market is tending towards specific 
outcomes and make adjustments if necessary.  
An example of how we looked at the various time periods is seen in Figure 3 and Figure 
4, which depict a snapshot of some of the graphs we created for monthly analysis.  Figure 3 
specifically shows the value of bonds which were bought on a daily basis in the month of 
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October for each specific pod. Therefore, in reading the graph the vertical axis shows the total 
value of the bonds in billions of United States Dollars and the horizontal depicts the specific 
days. The lines on the graph are relative to each pod; hence the grey line B-C illustrates bonds 
bought from the corporates pod, the orange line B-F shows bonds bought from financials pod 
and the blue line B-H shows bonds bought from companies classified as high yield. From this 
graph traders can easily ascertain that the value of corporate bonds that buy is greater than the 
amount bought for either high yield or financial bonds for the month of October.  
 
Figure 3: Buy Trend for the month of October (breakdown by Pod) 
 
Additionally traders themselves are grouped into pods so they would keenly benefit from 
seeing these trends broken out in this way. For example on October 4, 2011 there was an unusual 
spike in the buying of financial bonds by the traders in that group, amounting to over US $0.50 
billion on that day alone. To now ascertain the possible reasons the traders could go back into 
their records and see what could possibly have caused this sudden spike as it dropped slightly the 
next day but still maintained its high status before completely falling to around the average of 
between US$0.20 billion and US$0.30 billion for the rest of the month. Such insights could give 
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way to either a developing trend in the market or underscore a pre-existing trend that could be 
used to BAML’s advantage.  
Figure 4 on the other hand, illustrates the value of bonds which were sold on a daily basis 
in the month of October for each specific pod. Therefore similar to Figure 3 the vertical axis 
shows the total value of the bonds in billions of United States Dollars and the horizontal depicts 
the specific days. The lines on the graph are relative to each pod, hence the grey line S-C 
illustrates bonds sold from the corporates pod, the orange line S-F shows bonds sold from 
financials pod and the blue line S-H shows bonds sold from companies classified as high yield. 
With both of these graphs, traders from each pod can see the whole picture of business activity 
for their given segment, thus enabling them to see if they are meeting trading goals sector of 
business. 
 
Figure 4: Sell Trend for the month of October (breakdown by Pod) 
 
A similar analysis was conducted based on the three different counterparties. A counter 
party refers to the type of business category the EMEA credit desk is catering to, specifically real 
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money, hedge funds and banks.  In both instances we took our examination a step further by 
including an analysis of the buy percentage for the different pods and counterparties. Buy 
percentages (Buy %) would be an indicator to tell whether clients are buying or selling thus 
enabling traders to gauge whether our clients are bullish or bearish. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show 
snapshots of some of the images we created in our analysis for pods and counterparties 
respectively. Buy percentage is depicted on the vertical axis, and on the horizontal axis we have 
the days of the week further broken down by time of day. The superimposed horizontal line at 
50% depicts where buy percentage and sell percentage (Sell %) are equal thus meaning that 
neither is doing better than the other. It should be noted that since these figures are from an 
internal perspective, a high buy % means that the clients are bearish and low buy % (High sell 
%) means that the clients are bullish. 
Figure 5 shows the pod buy percentage for the week of October 3
rd
 2011. The graph itself 
illustrates cumulative of all three pods, how much is being bought and sold from a BAML 
perspective. Hence for Figure 5 in particular we see that the week begins with a high buy % 
meaning that clients were very bearish on October 3
rd
 and 4
th
. However, after a few fluctuations 
on the 5
th
, by Thursday October 6 a high sell % reins indicating a more bullish shift on the part of 
BAML’s clients. Reviewing such a graph and the indicators of such trends at the end of the week 
can aid traders in aligning themselves more closely with the needs of customers for the next 
week.  
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Figure 5: Buy Percentage for one week of October (breakdown by Pod) 
  
On the other hand, Figure 6, depicted on the next page, looks at counterparties and is for 
the week of November 28
th 
2011. Similar to Figure 5 above, Figure 6 depicts the cumulative buy 
% for all three counterparties for a given week and it also to be viewed from an internal 
perspective. From this graph it is evident that for this particular week whatever mode the market 
is in, bullish or bearish, at the end of trading on a particular day it starts in the completely 
opposite direction the next day. For example, after a particularly bearish day with a high buy % 
on the BAML side for November 28
th
, the day ended with clients becoming more bullish. 
Nevertheless, at the opening of the market on the 29
th
 weariness may have set in, as shown by 
the low buy percentage trend which broke and gave way to a high buy percentage at 8 am. Such 
a trend continues for the rest of the week as even when counterparties closes with a high buy % 
on November 30
th
, clients became very bullish to start off the morning of December 1. 
Reviewing such an illustration along with the actual raw data at the end of each week can either 
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highlight this as a normal trend, or underscore some incident that may have occurred that week 
which may have induced such actions on the part of the business and its clients.  
 
Figure 6: Buy Percentage for one week of November (breakdown by Counterparty) 
 
 With all this data, traders can be more efficient. Being in the markets on a daily basis, 
traders generally have a good idea as to what is going on,  but such analysis can serve to further 
verify their impression of what is happening in the market or it can offer insight to avenues that 
they had not considered in the decision making process. It should be noted that as a result of the 
sensitive nature of the data collected, we are unable to provide a more in-depth perspective on 
the analysis in our report. 
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4.3.   ANALYSIS OF HOW TO IMPROVE REPORTS AND MAKE THEM MORE 
ATTRACTIVE TO RECIPIENTS 
 The final phase was to conduct a descriptive analysis on each of the reports presently 
being produced. This was done to ascertain if anything needed to be changed and if deemed 
necessary, make suggestions on flaws and improvements where needed. 
4.3.1 CREDIT CLIENT TIERING OUTSTANDING FIRM/NON-FIRM REQUESTS 
 
Table 4 below, illustrates the inquires that are outstanding, i.e. not completed or 
converted to orders based on client tiering. BAML groups their clients into tiers so that they can 
readily see the volume of business that is being conducted with a particular tier of client. For 
example, BAML would prefer to do most of its business with their gold clients as opposed to 
clients that they categorize as aggressive. For more information on client tiering please see 
Appendix C: Glossary of Terms for the Credit & Cash Databases Used by the EMEA 
Credit Desk. 
 At times this daily report is sent out blank and other times it is populated. Due to the 
proprietary nature of this data the table below was intentionally left blank and the date was 
removed. The fact that sometimes this report is blank at the end of the day, could indicate that 
either there are no inquiries outstanding for that day or the data is not being effectively captured. 
This could be useful on a managerial level to see how much business is being left undone with a 
particular tier of clients.  
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 Client Firm/Non-Firm Outstanding End of Day Requests 
  
 
 
IPS 
Symbol 
Client 
Name 
User 
First 
Name 
User 
Last 
Name 
Current 
Tier 
Current 
Firm Price 
Setting 
Requested 
Firm Price 
Update 
BBG 
Login 
Tier 
Added/Updated 
By 
         
         
 
Table 4: Reviewed Report – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed  
 
4.3.2 TRADEWEB BENCHMARK PRICES COB 
This daily report comes in the form of an excel file. A snapshot of it is shown below in Table 5: 
Benchmark_Isin Benchmark_Desc BM_Bid_Price BM_Bid_Yield BM_Ask_Price BM_Ask_Yield 
      
      
Table 5: Reviewed Report – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
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The report shows Close of Business Benchmark Prices for a particular day. The 
Benchmark_Isin and Benchmark_Desc are unique identifiers that correlate a certain products 
ticker, coupon and maturity. For example, to the untrained eye one would assume under 
Benchmark_Desc that the Date shown is the date of the maturity of the bond and the ‘4.25’ 
would be the coupon price and ‘DBR’ would be bond ticker. Therefore since the ‘BM_ISIN’ and 
the ‘BM_Desc’ show the same thing in just in different formats, the report could be simplified by 
just using one.  
The ‘bid’ is the highest price being offered by the buyers and the ‘ask’ is the lowest price 
the sellers will accept. The BM_Ask_Yield is the rate of return that a buyer would get if they 
bought the bond at the asked price.  It could be beneficial to show a Bid-Ask Spread to see the 
size of the spread from one bond to another and then if the trader is interested they can use the 
BM_ISIN or BM_Desc to back trace how successful trades are given the size of the spread.  
4.3.3 CDS TWQ BMLE (EMEA) - ALL TRANSACTIONS (PRODUCTION) 
The CDS TWQ BMLE (EMEA) daily report comes in the form of an excel file that 
contains all the information regarding the CDS trades irrespective of their trade status on a given 
day. This file is too dense as it just regurgitates all the information regarding all CDS trades for 
the day and then it is up to the recipient to extrapolate the relevant information. So as not to 
undermine the value of the raw data, this file could still be sent out to persons who want to trace 
the trade actions themselves. However, there are additional ways to simplify the data so that 
persons who do not really need all this information are not inundated with all this data. 
Upon review of the table, we have highlighted just a few ways this report could be 
simplified. For example, under the Trader column, this would be better received if it showed the 
32 | P a g e  
 
actual trader instead of the NBK ID. The NBK ID is akin to an employee ID number.  
Additionally, the CDS Name includes the Sub GROUP name; therefore both do not necessarily 
need to be displayed. The columns Subordinate, Reconstruction and Series could be eliminated 
since they seemingly always return a value of ‘NA’ and ‘ITRAXX’ respectively.  
This raw data could be made more useful to both managers and traders if it was broken 
into subsets. For example, a report showing a Trader Analysis, illustrated below in Table 6 and 
Figure 7, could be done on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis to show if there are trends based 
on trader and time of day. Due to the proprietary nature of this information, the specific date this 
data was taken from has been removed from the table and figures. 
Sum of Quantity Column Labels 
   Row Labels Employee Employee  Employee Grand Total  
7 AM            50,000,000     50,000,000  
 
    100,000,000  
8 AM          180,000,000     40,000,000  
 
    220,000,000  
9 AM          375,000,000     55,000,000  
 
    430,000,000  
10 AM          225,000,000  
  
    225,000,000  
11 AM          130,000,000  
  
    130,000,000  
12 PM          268,000,000    50,000,000  
 
    318,000,000  
1 PM          255,000,000     15,000,000  
 
    270,000,000  
2 PM          370,000,000  
 
20,000,000      390,000,000  
3 PM          125,000,000  
  
    125,000,000  
4 PM            15,000,000  
  
      15,000,000  
Grand Total       1,993,000,000  210,000,000  20,000,000   2,223,000,000  
 
Table 6: Hourly Nominal USD for each trader – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
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Figure 7: Daily trend for each trader – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
 
In addition, data could be grouped based on SUBGroup and time and then trends based 
on what SUBGroups trade the most at what times, could also be relevant to managers. This is 
seen in the Table 7 and Figure 8 shown below. 
Sum of Quantity 
      
Time Sub Group 1 Sub Group 2 
Sub Group 
3 Sub Group 4 Sub Group 5 Grand Total 
7 AM 
 
      50,000,000  
  
    50,000,000      100,000,000  
8 AM           75,000,000        40,000,000  
 
105,000,000  
 
    220,000,000  
9 AM              5,000,000      375,000,000  
 
   50,000,000  
 
    430,000,000  
10 AM            50,000,000      100,000,000  
 
   75,000,000  
 
    225,000,000  
11 AM 
 
    100,000,000  
 
   30,000,000  
 
    130,000,000  
12 PM 
 
    300,000,000  
 
   18,000,000  
 
    318,000,000  
1 PM           15,000,000      220,000,000  
 
   35,000,000  
 
    270,000,000  
2 PM 
 
    350,000,000  20,000,000     20,000,000  
 
    390,000,000  
3 PM           15,000,000        20,000,000  
 
   90,000,000  
 
    125,000,000  
4 PM 
   
   15,000,000  
 
      15,000,000  
Grand Total         160,000,000  1,555,000,000  20,000,000   438,000,000     50,000,000   2,223,000,000  
 
Table 7: Hourly Nominal USD breakdown by SUBgroup – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
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Figure 8: Daily trend for each SUBgroup – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
 
Furthermore, a report showing Trade status, Account Name and whether it is buy vs. sell 
could be relevant to managers who want to see the volume of the inquiries that are done vs. other 
trade statuses as well as the side of the trade. An example is seen in the Table 8 below.  
 
Sum of Quantity 
      
 
B B Total S 
 
S Total Grand Total 
 
EUR 
 
EUR USD 
  
Done 
         
960,000,000  
   
960,000,000  
 
1,028,000,000  
 
20,000,000  1,048,000,000  2,008,000,000  
Account Name 1 
  
      
25,000,000  
 
      
25,000,000  
      
25,000,000  
Account Name 2 
  
      
50,000,000  
 
      
50,000,000  
      
50,000,000  
Account Name 3 
  
    
100,000,000  
 
    
100,000,000  
    
100,000,000  
Expired 
          
50,000,000  
     
50,000,000  
   
      
50,000,000  
Account Name 4 
           
50,000,000  
      
50,000,000  
   
      
50,000,000  
Passed 
           
65,000,000  
      
65,000,000  
   
      
65,000,000  
Account Name 1 
           
25,000,000  
      
25,000,000  
   
      
25,000,000  
Account Name 5 
           
15,000,000  
      
15,000,000  
   
      
15,000,000  
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Account Name 6 
           
25,000,000  
      
25,000,000  
   
      
25,000,000  
TraderRejected 
         
100,000,000  
    
100,000,000  
   
    
100,000,000  
Account Name 1 
           
25,000,000  
      
25,000,000  
   
      
25,000,000  
Account Name 7 
           
75,000,000  
      
75,000,000  
   
      
75,000,000  
Grand Total 
      
1,175,000,000  
 
1,175,000,000  1,028,000,000  20,000,000  1,048,000,000  
 
2,223,000,000  
 
Table 8: The volume of the inquiries that are done vs. other trade statues – Confidential Bank of America Information 
has been removed 
 
4.3.4 CDS TWQ BMLE (EMEA) - DONE TRADES (PRODUCTION) 
This daily report comes in the form of an excel file and seems to be a subset of the CDS 
TWWQ BMLE (EMEA) – All Transactions (Productions) table. This file however only shows 
the trades that have a status of done on given day. This file, just like the previous, contains 
columns that could be eliminated, such as the columns Subordinate, Reconstruction and Series 
could be eliminated since they seemingly always return a value of ‘NA’ and ‘ITRAXX’ 
respectively.  
Extracted from this table could be data respecting at time of day and trades done with the 
respective reference companies from the SUBGroup category. This is shown in Table 9 and 
Figure 9.  
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Sum of 
Quantity 
   
 
B S 
Grand 
Total 
8 AM          102,000,000  
     
4,000,000  
 
106,000,000  
Sub Group 1            60,000,000  
 
   
60,000,000  
Sub Group 2              5,000,000  
 
     
5,000,000  
Sub Group 3            25,000,000  
 
   
25,000,000  
Sub Group 4            12,000,000  
    
4,000,000  
   
16,000,000  
9 AM            75,000,000  
 
   
75,000,000  
Sub Group 2            50,000,000  
 
   
50,000,000  
Sub Group 4            25,000,000  
 
   
25,000,000  
10 AM            10,000,000  
  
65,000,000  
   
75,000,000  
Sub Group 2            10,000,000  
   
50,000,000  
   
60,000,000  
Sub Group 4 
 
   
15,000,000  
   
15,000,000  
11 AM              5,000,000  
   
10,000,000  
   
15,000,000  
Sub Group 2              5,000,000  
 
     
5,000,000  
Sub Group 4 
 
  
10,000,000  
   
10,000,000  
12 PM 
 
   
20,000,000  
   
20,000,000  
Sub Group 4 
 
   
20,000,000  
   
20,000,000  
1 PM            50,000,000  
 
   
50,000,000  
Sub Group 2            50,000,000  
 
   
50,000,000  
2 PM            45,000,000  
  
50,000,000  
   
95,000,000  
Sub Group 1 
 
   
50,000,000  
   
50,000,000  
Sub Group 2            35,000,000  
 
   
35,000,000  
Sub Group 4            10,000,000  
 
   
10,000,000  
Grand Total          287,000,000  149,000,000  
 
436,000,000  
Table 9: Trades done with the respective reference companies – Confidential Bank of America Information has been 
removed 
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Figure 9: Trades done with the respective reference companies 
 
Additionally, analysis could be done as shown in Table 10 and Figure 10, on time vs. 
trader to show the performance of a given trader at specfic times of the day. Again it would be 
beneficial if this showed trader name instead of NBK. However, due to proprietary rules by Bank 
of America we have used “Employee” instead of the actual trader’s name in this report. 
Sum of Quantity Column Labels 
  
Row Labels B S 
Grand 
Total 
Employee  252000000 49000000 301000000 
8 AM 67000000 4000000 71000000 
9 AM 75000000 
 
75000000 
10 AM 10000000 15000000 25000000 
11 AM 5000000 10000000 15000000 
12 PM 
 
20000000 20000000 
1 PM 50000000 
 
50000000 
2 PM 45000000 
 
45000000 
Employee 10000000 100000000 110000000 
8 AM 10000000 
 
10000000 
10 AM 
 
50000000 50000000 
2 PM 
 
50000000 50000000 
Employee 25000000 
 
25000000 
8 AM 25000000 
 
25000000 
Grand Total 287000000 149000000 436000000 
Table 10: Time vs. Trader Buy/Sell – Confidential Bank of America Information has been removed 
B
S
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Figure 10: Time vs. Trader Buy/Sell 
4.3.5 ITRADER CLIENT ORIGINATED INQUIRIES 
The above named report comes in the form of an excel document attached to the email 
and is generated on a daily basis. This table includes all daily Nominal USD of All Inquiries and 
the Accepted Inquires including the respective Counts for those values starting from the first 
trading day of the previous year to the present day. Thus, two years of data is stored in this 
document. Table 11, Table 12 and  Figure 11, Figure 12 are an example of brief tables that 
aggregate all this data into monthly totals and the corresponding graph. However, to the 
proprietary nature of the information, specific dates have been removed from Figures 11 and 12. 
B
S
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Table 11: Monthly Totals (Tickets Count) 
 
 
 Figure 11: Monthly Totals (Tickets Count) – Confidential Bank of America information has been removed  
Column Labels
2010 2011
Total Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (Accepted 
Inquiries)
Total Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (ALL 
Inquiries)
Row Labels
Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (Accepted 
Inquiries)
Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (ALL 
Inquiries)
Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (Accepted 
Inquiries)
Sum of Ticket 
COUNT (ALL 
Inquiries)
Jan 5,020                    31,745              4,417                   37,083.00           9,437                      68,828                     
Feb 6,120                    33,260              5,594                   38,160.00           11,714                     71,420                     
Mar 7,022                    38,475              5,299                   39,660.00           12,321                     78,135                     
Apr 6,390                    39,211              4,095                   32,473.00           10,485                     71,684                     
May 6,488                    49,697              4,380                   33,334.00           10,868                     83,031                     
Jun 8,183                    44,418              4,475                   37,776.00           12,658                     82,194                     
Jul 7,065                    38,600              4,195                   40,229.00           11,260                     78,829                     
Aug 6,595                    32,624              3,468                   53,964.00           10,063                     86,588                     
Sep 7,789                    42,127              4,988                   59,403.00           12,777                     101,530                    
Oct 6,504                    38,349              7,447                   64,380.00           13,951                     102,729                    
Nov 5,019                    37,482              2,962                   25,600.00           7,981                      63,082                     
Dec 4,247                    38,702              4,247                      38,702                     
Grand Total 76,442                  464,690            51,320                 462,062.00         127,762                   926,752                    
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Figure 12: Monthly Totals (Volume Nominal USD) – Confidential Bank of America information has been removed 
 
Table 12: Monthly Totals (Volume Nominal USD) 
Column Labels
2010 2011
Total Sum of Nominal USD 
(Accepted Inquiries)
Total Sum of Nominal USD 
(ALL Inquiries)
Row Labels
Sum of Nominal USD 
(Accepted Inquiries)
Sum of Nominal USD 
(ALL Inquiries)
Sum of Nominal USD 
(Accepted Inquiries)
Sum of Nominal USD 
(ALL Inquiries)
Jan 2,634,536,197.00$           21,013,177,056.00$           2,052,708,814.00$      23,128,725,011.00$   4,687,245,011.00$                44,141,902,067.00$             
Feb 2,639,910,008.00$           20,881,617,812.00$           2,670,087,230.00$      21,920,975,328.00$   5,309,997,238.00$                42,802,593,140.00$             
Mar 3,383,235,516.00$           22,960,876,137.00$           2,393,239,339.00$      24,016,183,738.00$   5,776,474,855.00$                46,977,059,875.00$             
Apr 3,172,180,054.00$           30,537,047,291.00$           1,822,644,160.00$      19,475,912,877.00$   4,994,824,214.00$                50,012,960,168.00$             
May 2,166,796,870.00$           24,839,579,848.00$           2,223,858,466.00$      21,038,918,800.00$   4,390,655,336.00$                45,878,498,648.00$             
Jun 2,533,984,271.00$           20,799,470,388.00$           2,130,242,535.00$      22,221,089,178.00$   4,664,226,806.00$                43,020,559,566.00$             
Jul 2,713,251,673.00$           20,705,894,230.00$           1,739,428,609.00$      21,945,723,961.00$   4,452,680,282.00$                42,651,618,191.00$             
Aug 2,695,109,573.00$           17,370,528,963.00$           1,373,891,358.00$      27,036,562,226.00$   4,069,000,931.00$                44,407,091,189.00$             
Sep 3,123,748,363.00$           22,952,338,906.00$           1,573,820,623.00$      27,309,779,619.00$   4,697,568,986.00$                50,262,118,525.00$             
Oct 2,973,196,776.00$           22,494,908,172.00$           2,744,515,710.00$      29,299,775,773.00$   5,717,712,486.00$                51,794,683,945.00$             
Nov 2,345,069,948.00$           23,051,517,924.00$           1,112,684,870.00$      12,263,365,669.00$   3,457,754,818.00$                35,314,883,593.00$             
Dec 1,519,803,648.00$           17,650,862,589.00$           1,519,803,648.00$                17,650,862,589.00$             
Grand Total 31,900,822,897.00$         265,257,819,316.00$         21,837,121,714.00$    249,657,012,180.00$  53,737,944,611.00$              514,914,831,496.00$           
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4.3.6 ECOMMERCE STATISTICS - EMEA FLOW CREDIT PRIORITY CLIENTS 
This is a daily report which comes in the form of two tables. The first table would 
normally highlight the hit rate based on client, thus managers can see on a client-by-client basis 
how successful they are meeting the inquires/orders, however this confidential information was 
removed from our report.  A snapshot of this is shown below in Table 13. 
 eCommerce Statistics - EMEA Flow Credit Priority Clients 
  
 
Client 
Hit 
Rate 
Done Not Done 
Done 
Away 
None Total USD 
Total 
Count 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Table 13: Reviewed Report – Confidential Bank of America information has been removed 
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The next Table 14 then takes the above table and breaks out the hit rate by trader so both 
managers and traders can see a trader’s respective hit rate depending on a specific client. This is 
shown below with the confidential information removed. A trader could also use this total of 
their respective hit rates and find an average for the day. In either instance, one can thus track on 
a daily, week, and monthly basis to see if there are particular client trends or time sensitive 
trends.  
 eCommerce Statistics - EMEA Flow Credit Priority Clients 
  
Client Trader 
Hit 
Rate 
Done Not Done 
Done 
Away 
None Total USD 
Total 
Count 
         
         
         
         
         
Table 14: Reviewed Report – Confidential Bank of America information has been removed 
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Subsequently, after our analysis of EMEA Reports produced and distributed by 
ConnectX, we came to the conclusion that not all the reports need to be changed. However, 
eCommerce Statistics - EMEA Flow Credit Priority Clients is a report that could benefit from 
some modifications by including the analysis we did in sections 4.1 and 4.2.  Along a similar 
vein, it became apparent after interviewing some junior traders that some of the reports would be 
more useful if they were separated by pod information instead of by individual trader statistics. 
This would provide a more holistic picture of how the different sectors of the desk are doing on a 
daily basis. The responses from our interviews can be found in Appendix B: Interview 
Questions for Junior Traders. 
Shown in Table 15 below, was the report we used to implement the changes described 
above using SQL programming language, so it would be easier for Bank of America to insert the 
code into ConnectX.   
 
 
Table 15: Reviewed Report – Confidential Bank of America information has been removed 
 
The breakdown by Pods is shown in Table 16, where tickets, broken down by volume 
(nominal USD) that were accepted, expired, rejected or passed by a client for a particular day are 
grouped by Corporates, Financials and High Yield instead of individual trader. For example, the 
proposed table shows total accepted tickets by volume of the Corporate Pod was 14,015,861 
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nominal USD at the end of the day rather than providing an information for each trader in 
alphabetized order. The SQL code was written in such way that if it is run at the end of the day it 
automatically uses data for that exact day. Due to the proprietary nature of the SQL code, this 
information was removed from the report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: SQL output for the breakdown by pod 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout many weeks of analysis we have come to our first conclusion. It is regarding 
the reporting tool, ConnectX. ConnectX was a reporting tool/application built by Merrill Lynch 
that was used to send reports on a timely basis to managers and traders at the Credit and Rates 
Desk and was then brought on board and used by the credit EMEA desk Bank of America when 
the acquisition of Merrill Lynch took place. This tool carries out the task that was initially built 
to do.  That being said, full utility is not being gained from the reports and it costs money to 
maintain. Traders have a busy 11 – 12 hour day, and most do not think it is necessary to open 
these reports as they feel that no instant added value is garnered from them. Most of the 
information that the traders could get from these reports required them to do their own further 
analysis.  
This therefore, leads to our second conclusion that, the reporting system can and needs to 
be improved. The present system using ConnectX does not allow for the production of visuals in 
the reports, which could provide added value as a supplement to the already given raw data. 
Furthermore, reports would be more useful if they were separated by Pod, Trader, etc. 
If these improvements are made, it stands to reason that these reports can give added 
insight to the business. They could be used as performance measures, which could lead to a more 
profitable business.  For example, managers can readily see more accurate Hit Rates for priority 
clients and make adjustments where possible. For traders, they create these markets and are 
charged with making the business money so if they can use these reports to anticipate what their 
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individual markets are doing then they can attack trades with more knowledge and potentially 
become more profitable.  
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the completion of our project at Bank of America Merrill Lynch we have formed our 
recommendations based on the above conclusions. The first recommendation is to change the 
organization of the reports, specifically organize by pod. During our project we had a chance to 
speak with a few traders and ask them questions regarding the ConnectX reports that they get 
daily. To the question “What would you change in the reports?” most of them answered that they 
would like to see a breakdown by pod. A pod, as was mentioned earlier, is a sector of business 
and there are three pods: Corporates that trade corporate products, Financials that trade financial 
products and High Yield (HY) that trade high yield products. Since the current reports contain a 
breakdown by trader, it would be beneficial to see a breakdown by pod as well, since some of the 
traders are in the same pod and trade the same products.  
Our next recommendation is to introduce a graphical tool that can produce visuals. Some 
of the reports that ConnectX generates come as an Excel attachment and bank employees need to 
open the attachment and do further analysis on their own to gain any added value. However, 
introducing graphs and charts that summarizes the information in the attached file would provide 
an insight to data and be less time-consuming. Some of the interviewed traders also mentioned 
that they would like to see visuals. The limitation is that ConnectX uses SQL as a programming 
language and doesn’t have an ability to build graphs and charts. There are a few solutions to this: 
to program ConnectX in Python or Quartz, or graph in Excel that would take a lot of time.      
And finally, our last recommendation, if the business is moving towards a centralized 
database and reporting system, either augment ConnectX to carry out our previous 
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recommendations and roll it out to the other desk, or leverage what works about ConnectX and 
implement it into a new system. 
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APPENDIX A: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Aznie Zainudin, W. R., & Board, J. (2011). Comparisons between transparency in the United 
States of America (US) corporate bond market and European corporate bond market: criticisms 
of transparency in us markets from European markets perspective. Communications of the 
IBIMA, 1(5), 42-46.  
Communications of the IBIMA (CIBIMA) is an online open access journal that publishes full 
papers that have been blindly reviewed. The aim of the CIBIMA is to publish quality research 
papers, view points, and conceptual papers that significantly contribute the body knowledge 
of the field of information management in terms of theory and practice. This particular article 
written by Aznie Zainudin & Board investigates the differences between the impacts of 
transparency in the US and European Corporate Bond Markets by studying the criticisms of 
transparency in the US markets from European markets perspective. The study makes two 
assumptions namely as the level of understanding on transparency in the European market 
increase; the spreads decrease and the volume of trading do not decrease. The results of such 
a study has given us market insight on how bonds might trade given the level transparency of 
the market.  
 
Heston, S., & Sadka, R. (2010). Seasonality in the cross section of stock returns: the international 
evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), 1133–1160. 
 The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis publishes theoretical and empirical 
research in financial economics. This paper written by Heston & Sadka studies seasonal 
predictability in the cross section of international stock returns. From their research were able 
to conclude that stocks that outperform the domestic market in a particular month continue to 
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outperform the domestic market in that same calendar month for up to 5 years. Such a pattern 
appeared in Canada, Japan, and 12 European countries. Review studies such as these provides 
insight into the different kind of trends and what are some of the correlating factors that could 
impact the decisions of traders and thus the volume of trades that come to the Bank of 
America “Deck”. 
 
Shahrokhi, M. (2008). E-finance: status, innovations, resources and future challenges. 
Managerial Finance, 34(6), 365 - 398. 
The journal, Managerial Finance, aims to provide an international forum for the publication 
of high quality research in: finance, financial management, international finance, economics, 
banking, financial markets, financial institutions, financial strategy, accounting and 
management information, corporate finance, investments, real estate, insurance and risk 
management, global finance, financial education and all other issues related to finance.   
The paper by Shakrokhi was to provide an overview of the status of e-finance and discuss 
related issues and challenges at the time. It provided data about growth of e-finance in the 
last decade leading up to 2008 and sough to introduce advances and innovations in e-finance 
and challenges facing the financial services and IT industries in the economic climate of that 
time. As the paper brought together dispersed information and data about e-finance under one 
umbrella, it provides an outsider looking in insight into the advances in e-finance and 
applications of innovations and new technology to financial services provided. 
Understanding the innovations made in e-finance at such a tumultuous time in the world 
markets could be key in getting into the minds of present day traders and how specific market 
conditions could lead to distinct actions or reactions today.  
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Smith, R. (2011). The Dilemma of Bailouts. The Independent Review, 16(1), 15-26. 
The Independent Review is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the study of political 
economy and the critical analysis of government policy. In this article, the author, 
Smith, reviews financial crises in the United States from 1984 to the present from the 
standpoint of regulators, politicians, economists and average citizens. While this paper 
is not about banking regulation it is helpful to read works such as Smiths to gain 
insight on the mind frame of clients as instruments such as credit default swaps were 
heavily blamed for the economic meltdown of 2008 yet they are still traded today and 
is the partial focus of this report. 
  
Stulz, R. M. (2010). Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 73-92. 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) is an economic journal published by 
the American Economic Association and it attempts to fill a gap between the general interest 
press and most other academic economics journals. In the article the author seeks to find 
what place, credit default swaps may have had in the credit crisis. It looks at the concern that 
observers have that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated over-the-counter 
market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they facilitate speculation 
involving negative views of a firm's financial strength. Versus the opposing view held by 
some observers that have suggested that credit default swaps would not have made the crisis 
worse had they traded on exchanges. In the end, the writer concludes that credit default 
swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis, that the over-the-counter credit 
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default swaps market worked well during much of the crisis, and that exchange trading has 
both advantages and costs compared to over-the-counter trading. This article has helped us to 
shed some light onto how CDS's are viewed in the financial market in general. 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR JUNIOR 
TRADERS 
1. Do you use ConnectX Reports? 
a. If yes, which ones do you find the most useful? 
b. If No, why not? 
2. What do think could enhance the reports i.e. make them more useful? 
3. Do you think graphs showing individual performance embedded into the reports would 
be useful? 
4. Would you rather they come as an e-mail or would you rather have a website or 
application you can access and have it have your personal data and you can splice the day 
up yourself? 
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APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR THE CREDIT 
& CASH DATABASES USED BY THE EMEA CREDIT 
DESK 
 
BAML-EMEA Credit Glossary - AQCombined Report 
Field Name Function Definition of Outputs 
Id serves as a primary key Primary Key Created by BAML 
PLATFORM 
platform where trade 
originates 
BB-Bloomberg, MKA - Axcess, 
TWB-EUCORP - Trade Web, 
RTFI-Reuters 
PLATFORM_REF 
Platform Reference 
Number 
Unique identifier of the inquiry on 
the platform 
TRADE_DATE Date Date of Trade 
TRADE_TIME Time Time of Initiation of trade 
TRADER BAML Employee ID 
Identifier for BAML employee 
who clicks/responds to the ticket 
TYPE Type of ticket/order 
Inquiry - This is a bond in 
competition. Here price and size is 
shown. If we do have a price or 
size the client may submit an 
order;  Order - This goes to one 
trader and it means the client is 
willing to buy or sell. 
QUOTED Response to order 
In case of an order, it tells us 
whether we sent a level back. Did 
we acknowledge their request? (If 
it is an inquiry then this field is not 
useful) 
AUTOQUOTED_AUTOEXECUTED 
Under a certain level 
either automatically put 
through the trade or 
automatically sent the 
price level for an inquiry 
Whether automatic action was 
taken for an inquiry or a trade  
LAST_DEALER_ACTION 
Status of the inquiry from 
the dealers perspective 
Done - Trade completed; None - 
Trade was ignored; Rejected - 
BAML rejected the trade; Quoted 
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- BAML sent a level 
LAST_CLIENT_ACTION 
Status of inquiry from 
clients perspective 
Done - Trade Completed; Sent - 
Client Sent Level; Expired - Trade 
was ignored; Passed - Client 
rejected the trade 
ACTION_DETAIL 
Encapsulates the four 
previous columns 
Encapsulates the four precious 
columns 
DONEAWAY_DETAIL 
In the case where the trade 
is not done, then this gives 
the reason. 
Cover - we were second best price; 
None - no information was given; 
Tied - we had the same price as the 
winner but for some reason client 
chose another dealer 
DEALERS 
Total number of dealers on 
trade at the time 
How many dealers were involved 
in the trade including BAML 
CLIENT_NAME Name of client Name of Client 
IPS_SYMBOL 
Unique identifier of the 
client Internal identifier for a client 
CLIENT_TIER Tier that client is assigned 
Gold: Best Client; Silver: Good 
Client; Bronze: Average Client; 
Aggressive: Worse than an 
average client 
CLIENT_USER 
Platform definition of 
Client  
Username of client that raised the 
inquiry  
ML_BUY_SELL 
Whether BAML is being 
asked to buy or sell 
Whether BAML is being asked to 
buy or sell 
ISIN 
Unique identifier that 
comes from a correlation 3 
attributes 
Correlates the data captured by 
Ticker, Coupon & Maturity into a 
unique identifier 
TICKER Ticker of Bond Bond Client makes inquiry about 
COUPON Coupon of Bond Coupon Price 
MATURITY Maturity of Bond Date when bond matures 
NOMINAL_EURO 
Converts the nominal size 
of the inquiry into Euros Size of the inquiry in Euros 
NOMINAL_USD 
Converts the nominal size 
of the inquiry into USD Size of the inquiry in USD 
NOMINAL Nominal size of inquiry 
Size of the inquiry in the bonds 
native currency 
CURRENCY   Native currency of the bond 
PRICE Gives price of level quoted Level Quoted 
COVER_PRICE Price of second best offer Second Best Price 
SALES_NAME Name of sales person Name of the sales person 
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ORIGIN 
Where is the trade coming 
from 
C - Client coming to us directly; S 
- Sales person puts in the trade on 
behalf of client (facilitates the 
booking of the trade); T - some 
other trader within the firm  
BM Spread   
Different way of communicating 
the price.  
DESK   
Desk where trade originated. e.g. 
Credit 
 
BAML-EMEA CDS Glossary – CDS Reports 
Field Name Function Definition of Outputs 
Trade Date Date Date of Trade 
Trade Time Time Time of Initiation of trade 
Market Market Symbol Name of the Market 
Negotiation Id 
Unique identifier on the platform that we 
are trading 
  
TEA Id Market_TradeDate_Negotiation Id 
Contains Market, Trade and 
Negotiation Id 
CDS Name Name of CDS, contract 
Which contract we are trading 
defines what contracts reference 
is  
Side 
Tells us whether we are being asked to 
Buy or Sell 
  
Quantity Quantity  
Quantity of CDS that is being 
traded 
Trade Status Status of a trade 
Done - Trade Completed; 
Rejected - Trade Rejected; 
Expired - Trade was ignored; 
Passed - Client rejected the trade 
Executing Trader BAML Employee ID 
Identifier for BAML employee 
who executes the trade 
Portfolio 
Tells us if/when trade is done and where 
the trade is put 
Books of trades 
Price/Spread 
Gives price/spread of CDS, high yield -> 
price 
Different way of communicating 
the price.  
Price Type   Spread 
Deal Spread 
Every contract a distinct deal Spread ( all 
trades are done on this deal spread, e.g. 
100 or 500 basis points) 
The difference b/w deal spread 
and price/spread 
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Fee 
PV of difference between Deal Spread 
and Price/Spread 
  
Currency Currency Symbol Native currency of the bond 
Customer Name Name of customer Name of the customer 
Account Id Unique identifier of the client's account 
Internal identifier for a client's 
account 
Account Name Name of client's firm Name of the client's account 
Sales Person Name of sales person Name of the sales person 
Trade Type Type of the trade 
Order or inquiry, RSM - request 
from market 
BBG Ticker Ticker of CDS in Bloomberg   
RedCode 
Unique identifier for a CDS instrument, 
the market standard 
There is the same Redcode in all 
markets to identify the specific 
contract that is being traded 
Maturity Maturity of CDS Date when CDS matures 
Tenor 
Term- time in years between a next CDS 
roll and its maturity (rolls happen every 
three months) 
Length of time b/w the next CDS 
roll and the maturity  
Subordination 
Bond that a CDS is referring to 
(Characteristics of the CDS contracts) 
has to do with the bond that CDS 
is referring to 
Restructuring 
Defining which sorts of events can 
trigger a CDS payment 
has to do with defining which 
types of the event can trigger the 
CDS payments 
Series Type Type of the series  ITRAX 
Sub GROUP Reference companies 
Main - Investment grade 
European companies, XOVER - 
non-investment grade European 
companies, Fin Sen - senior debt 
of European financial companies, 
Fin Sub - subordinated debt of 
European financial companies, 
West Eur - debt of COUNTRIES 
in Europe 
Index Series serious type  
every 6 months a new index is 
proposed 
CDS Type Type of CDS INDEX 
CDS Owner Name  Name of the owner of CDS 
 
 
